# Webdev Agent OS v20 — Autonomous Security Assurance & Threat Resilience

## Purpose

The Security Assurance system connects product evidence, architecture, source-code provenance, runtime behavior, recovery readiness, and human security judgment into one controlled assurance loop.

Its purpose is not to declare a system “secure.” Its purpose is to maintain explicit evidence about:

- what must be protected;
- how the system can be attacked or abused;
- where exposure exists;
- which controls are expected to prevent, detect, or contain harm;
- whether those controls have been verified;
- what vulnerabilities remain open;
- which remediations are reviewable and reversible;
- whether incident containment has been rehearsed;
- what human approvals are still required.

## Assurance chain

```text
Product and architecture evidence
→ Threat model
→ Attack-surface inventory
→ Security-control digital twin
→ Safe scanning and abuse simulation
→ Governed adversarial campaign
→ Vulnerability evidence
→ Reversible remediation
→ Independent verification
→ Containment rehearsal
→ Approval-gated response playbook
→ Updated security posture
```

## Operating principles

### Evidence before confidence

Statuses such as `effective`, `passed`, `verified`, and `resolved` require evidence references. A generated claim, a developer opinion, or a clean-looking dashboard is not sufficient.

### No secret collection

Secret scans may retain fingerprints, finding categories, and redacted locations. They may not retain raw credentials, private keys, access tokens, passwords, session material, or other reusable secrets.

### Independent approval

The author of an adversarial campaign, containment rehearsal, response playbook, or remediation may not approve or verify their own consequential work.

### Isolation before adversarial action

Destructive or disruptive testing must be isolated and must define safeguards plus abort conditions. Live production testing remains outside the automatic execution boundary.

### Reversible remediation

Security remediations require rollback evidence. Fixes must not trade one uncontrolled risk for another.

### Client boundary

Client roles cannot access source-level vulnerabilities, internal controls, attack paths, secret-scan fingerprints, or response procedures. Client communication must be generated through the scoped delivery and incident-management layers.

## Data domains

### Security programs

Define owners, risk tolerance, affected projects and Digital Twins, capacity, success criteria, and constraints.

### Threat models

Capture assets, actor profiles, attack paths, likelihood, impact, controls, owners, and evidence.

### Attack surfaces

Inventory web applications, APIs, webhooks, repositories, data stores, observability systems, dependencies, and infrastructure boundaries.

### Security-control twin

Controls describe prevention, detection, response, coverage, affected threats, code or configuration artifacts, tests, owners, and latest evidence.

### Scans

The current contract supports dependency, secret, configuration, static-analysis, security-header, and container evidence. Registration of a scanner is not proof that it ran.

### Abuse simulations

Exercise authorization, authentication, resource exhaustion, malformed input, replay, duplicate delivery, and integration abuse in isolated environments.

### Adversarial campaigns

Campaigns are broader, approval-gated exercises with explicit scope, safeguards, abort conditions, reviewer evidence, start evidence, and findings.

### Vulnerabilities and remediations

Findings are linked to attack surfaces, artifacts, threats, owners, due dates, patches, tests, rollback references, and independent verification.

### Containment rehearsals and response playbooks

Measure how quickly the system can contain an event, preserve evidence, communicate appropriately, recover safely, and verify that the threat no longer has an active path.

### Architecture tournaments

Competing security architectures can be scored on risk reduction, coverage, operability, cost, and delivery speed. A reviewer records the selected option and rationale.

## Automatic and approval-gated actions

### May run automatically

- inventory comparison;
- control-coverage calculations;
- evidence normalization;
- dependency and configuration analysis in an isolated workspace;
- redacted secret-pattern scanning;
- safe static analysis;
- risk and readiness scoring;
- report generation;
- remediation and campaign recommendations.

### Requires independent approval

- adversarial campaign execution;
- destructive or disruptive simulations;
- credential rotation;
- account disablement;
- production traffic blocking;
- live containment;
- customer notification;
- vulnerability acceptance;
- security architecture selection;
- production remediation rollout;
- response-playbook activation.

## API

The live service exposes:

```text
GET  /api/security-assurance
GET  /api/security-assurance/stats
GET  /api/security-assurance/export
POST /api/security-assurance/report
POST /api/security-assurance/programs/:id/portfolio
```

Write endpoints also exist for threat models, attack surfaces, controls, scans, abuse tests, adversarial campaigns, vulnerabilities, remediations, containment rehearsals, response playbooks, architecture tournaments, and security campaigns.

## CLI

```bash
npm run security-assurance:stats
npm run security-assurance:report
node scripts/security-assurance-cli.js view
```

## Current example limitations

The bundled records are illustrative fixtures. No claim is made that an external scanner, source-control provider, identity provider, SIEM, EDR platform, cloud firewall, credential provider, production traffic router, or incident-management platform is connected.